Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme Court\u27s Decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana by Gumaer, Chelsea S.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2017
Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme
Court's Decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana
Chelsea S. Gumaer
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chelsea S. Gumaer, Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 50 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 257 (2017).
50.2_GUMAER_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18 9:08 PM 
 
257 
MAKING ROOM FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN  
MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA 
Chelsea S. Gumaer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Brendan Dassey, the child star of Netflix’s documentary series 
“Making a Murderer,” was convicted for assisting his uncle in 
murdering Teresa Halbach.1 Reasoning that Dassey’s youth, his 
unfamiliarity in dealing with the police, and his low IQ made him 
particularly susceptible to the coercive tactics employed by those 
interrogating him, the judge overturned his conviction on August 12, 
2016—nearly a decade after the 16-year-old boy was convicted.2 This 
headline case highlights the Supreme Court’s recent reevaluation of 
juveniles in the eyes of the criminal justice system, a trend made 
especially clear in the 2016 case of Montgomery v. Louisiana.3 
In Montgomery, the Court heard the challenge of a 65-year-old 
man who was sentenced to life in prison without parole for a crime he 
committed at the age of seventeen.4 The Court held that the rule laid 
out in its earlier decision of Miller v. Alabama,5 that the Eighth 
Amendment precluded mandatory sentences of life in prison without 
the possibility of parole,6 could be applied retroactively to juveniles 
that were sentenced years—even decades—before Miller was 
decided.7 In doing so, the Court not only recognized the psychological 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English Language and 
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Aaron Caplan for his indispensable guidence and editorial feedback and, to the entire editorial staff 
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Thank you to my family, my parents, brothers, and 
boyfriend for their unconditional love, patience, and unwavering support.  
 1. E.g. Dassey v. Dittmann, No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, at *17, *35 (E.D. Wis. 
Aug. 12, 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016). 
 4. Id. at 725-26. 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 6. Id. at 2460. 
 7. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
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and legal differences between juveniles and adults, adhering to the 
same reasoning used by the Miller court, but went on to seemingly 
expand the scope of habeas corpus relief available to prisoners who 
were convicted, and whose collateral appeals were denied, under state 
law.8 It is this latter point that was the main area of contention between 
the majority and the dissenting justices, who favored finality9 and 
federalism10 over retroactivity. To this point, the majority reasoned 
that its authority to decide the case, and the petitioner’s ability to take 
advantage of the Miller rule nearly fifty years after his indictment, was 
clearly established by the constitutional undertones of Teague v. 
Lane,11 a case which limited retroactive application of new rules in the 
context of federal habeas corpus relief.12 
This Comment explores Montgomery and argues that the majority 
was correct in holding that collateral courts must apply new 
substantive rules of constitutional law retroactively, and that the rule 
laid out in Miller is one such rule. Part II establishes the historical 
background upon which the majority’s decision rests, focusing on the 
previously narrow exceptions to habeas relief laid out in Teague and 
briefly outlining the Court’s decision in Miller. Part III details what 
happened in Montgomery’s case. Part IV describes the Court’s 
justification for reviewing a state court’s collateral proceedings, as 
well as the Court’s ability to impose the Miller rule retroactively. 
Finally, Part V analyzes what this case says about the Court’s stance 
on habeas corpus relief, arguing that this may be the Court’s attempt 
to reposition itself as a more habeas-friendly forum. 
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Habeas Corpus Relief 
Habeas corpus relief is the result of a collateral attack13 brought 
by a convicted prisoner whose sentence has already been made final.14 
Established originally as a common law writ, habeas relief has been 
 
 8. Id. at 728. 
 9. See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. See id. at 745 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 11. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 12. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
 13. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 171 (2016) (“A proceeding in habeas corpus which attacks the 
judgment or sentence of a criminal trial is, with respect to this judgment or sentence, a collateral 
attack.”). 
 14. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S 667, 682–83 (1971)). 
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federally codified,15 as well as recognized by states in their own 
collateral proceedings.16 Originally, federal habeas courts reviewed 
state court convictions with fresh eyes, determining whether the state 
court was correct in its analysis of the defendant’s case.17 However, 
federal courts quickly changed course following the Supreme Court 
decision of Teague v. Lane and the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter the “AEDPA”),18 
which placed “a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court 
to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus,” by 
limiting the scope of the federal court’s power to review the state 
court’s decision.19 In Teague, the Court addressed whether it was 
required to apply new rules of law retroactively to cases pending on 
collateral review at the time the new rules were announced.20 The 
Court held that, generally, a new constitutional rule does not apply 
retroactively to convictions that were final at the time the new rule was 
announced.21 However, Teague explained that courts must “give 
retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law,”22 as 
well as procedural rules that implicate the fairness and accuracy of the 
prisoner’s trial process.23 It was against this backdrop that the 
Montgomery Court made its decision. 
B.  The Miller Decision 
Like Montgomery, the Miller case, too, involved petitions for 
habeas relief by defendants sentenced as juveniles. Unlike 
Montgomery, however, the Miller Court created a new substantive rule 
 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 16. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.01 
(West 2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 882, 926 (2008). 
 17. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953) (reasoning that federal judges must 
determine if a “satisfactory conclusion has been reached” under the record viewed by the state 
court). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 104–132. 
 19. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411–13 (2000) (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue 
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 
application must also be unreasonable.”). 
 20. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295–96. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288). 
Unlike procedural rules, which govern the manner in which a defendant could be found guilty for 
their illegal conduct, substantive rules are those that interpret the Constitution and may prohibit a 
state from punishing a certain type of conduct altogether. Id. 
 23. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295. 
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of law, instead of attempting to retroactively apply a new rule of law. 
The Miller decision came after two other Supreme Court decisions 
aimed at reducing the severity of juvenile sentencing. First, in Roper 
v. Simmons, the Court held that juveniles could not be sentenced to 
death.24 Next, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life in prison 
without parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) was an unconstitutional 
sentence for juvenile non-homicide offenders.25 These cases left open 
the question to be decided by the Court in Miller: whether a juvenile 
could be sentenced to LWOP under a mandatory sentencing scheme. 
Miller consolidated the habeas proceedings of two boys who were 
sentenced to LWOP pursuant to their respective states’ mandatory 
sentencing schemes.26 The defendants in Miller argued that a 
mandatory sentence of LWOP violated the Eight Amendment when 
applied to 14-year-old children.27 The majority agreed, reasoning that 
mandatory schemes prevent sentencing courts from considering a 
defendant’s youth and corresponding attributes, and by doing so, 
automatically impose the harshest punishment available.28 To 
emphasize this point, the Court analogized LWOP for a child offender 
to that of the death penalty for an adult.29 However, unlike children 
sentenced to LWOP, adults sentenced under the death penalty receive 
individualized sentencing that provides them an opportunity to present 
mitigating factors.30 
The Court concluded that mandatory sentencing schemes for 
juveniles “pose too great a risk for disproportionate punishment.”31 It 
reasoned that “[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks 
and consequences.”32 Although stating that it was not imposing a 
categorical bar on LWOP for juvenile offenders, it held that this 
 
 24. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 25. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 26. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462–63 (2012). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. at 2466. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The Miller court borrowed the reasoning of the court in Graham. Id. at 2467 (citing 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 89-90). 
 31. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 32. Id. at 2468. 
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sentence could not—and would not—be applied, except in the rarest 
of cases.33 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the age of seventeen, Henry Montgomery murdered deputy 
sheriff Charles Hurt, in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.34 On February 
6, 1969, a jury convicted Montgomery of murder without capital 
punishment, triggering an automatic sentence of LWOP as required by 
Louisiana law.35 On June 25, 2012, almost 50 years after Montgomery 
was sentenced, the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of 
LWOP violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” when the accused was under the age of 
eighteen at the time he or she committed the crime.36 This new rule 
formed the basis of the argument underlying Montgomery’s motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, which he filed in Louisiana state court.37 
Under Louisiana law, prisoners may challenge their sentences 
collaterally by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the state 
trial court where the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.38 These 
state collateral review courts hear claims challenging already-final 
convictions that were recently deemed unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.39 
Montgomery did just that, arguing that Miller decreed his mandatory 
sentence illegal.40 
The East Baton Rouge Parish District Court denied 
Montgomery’s motion, ruling that Miller does not apply retroactively 
 
 33. Id. at 2469. 
 34. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016). 
 35. Id. at 725–726. Montgomery was originally convicted of murder and sentenced to death; 
however, this conviction was reversed, and a new trial required, after the Louisiana Supreme Court 
found that public prejudice caused an unfair trial. See State v. Montgomery, 47895 (La. 01/17/66); 
181 So. 2d 756. 
 36. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 37. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726–27. 
 38. Id. at 726; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 882 (2008). 
 39. For example, in State v. Shaffer, the Louisiana Supreme Court deleted the portion of a 
prisoner’s sentence that did not afford him the opportunity for parole in order to follow the United 
States Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate that mandatory life without parole convictions are 
unconstitutional for non-homicidal juvenile convicts. State v. Shaffer, 2011-1756 (La. 11/23/11); 
77 So. 3d 939, 942–43 (2011) (applying the rule given by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 
(2010), to a prisoner’s already final conviction of life in prison without parole); see Montgomery, 
136 S. Ct. at 726–27. 
 40. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
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on state collateral review.41 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, 
affirming the trial court’s determination that Miller does not apply to 
a state court’s collateral review because Miller simply announced a 
procedural rule of law.42 Montgomery then filed a writ for certiorari, 
asking the United States Supreme Court to address whether Miller 
announced a substantive rule of law that applies retroactively to a state 
court’s collateral review proceeding, which would render his 
mandatory sentence of LWOP illegal.43 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING 
A.  The Majority Opinion: Jurisdiction 
Two issues had to be addressed by the Court in Montgomery. 
First, because Montgomery’s collateral challenge was decided 
pursuant to Louisiana’s state law defining collateral proceedings, did 
the Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the Louisiana state court 
erred in refusing to apply a new rule of constitutional law 
retroactively?44 Second, assuming the Court did have jurisdiction to 
rule on the state court decision, is Miller’s prohibition on mandatory 
life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders a substantive rule 
that must be applied retroactively?45 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice majority, answered 
both questions in the affirmative.46 In answering the first question, the 
majority looked to the rule laid out in Teague.47 The majority’s 
reasoning hinged on the first exception to Teague’s general rule 
precluding retroactive application, holding that “when a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, 
the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give 
retroactive effect to that rule.”48 In so holding, the majority rejected 
the argument that Teague’s rule does not apply to a state collateral 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. The Louisiana Supreme court relied on its previous decision in State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La. 
11/5/13); 130 So.3d 829, which held that Miller did not apply retroactively because it laid out a 
procedural rule of law which, under Teague, could not be applied retroactively in a collateral review 
proceeding. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
 43. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 732, 736. 
 47. See supra Section II(A). 
 48. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729. 
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review proceeding brought under state statute because Teague ruled 
on a challenge to a proceeding in federal court brought under a federal 
statute.49 Instead, the majority found that Teague left unanswered 
whether its two exceptions are binding on the states.50 The Court 
articulated that because the Constitution mandates that substantive 
rules of law have retroactive effect, these substantive rules are binding 
on state courts regardless of what type of proceeding the rules are 
presented in.51 In other words, even when a state court is applying its 
state’s law governing collateral proceedings, that state court is bound 
by the Supreme Court’s new substantive rules of constitutional law.52 
The majority explained that these substantive constitutional rules 
protect a prisoner from being penalized for conduct that is now 
“constitutionally immune from punishment.”53 Simply put, “a 
conviction under an unconstitutional law is not merely erroneous, but 
is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.”54 
Because of this, “a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction 
or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the 
conviction or sentence became final before the rule was announced.”55 
Following this analysis, the next question the Court had to address 
seemed relatively simple. 
B.  Miller Announced a Substantive Rule of Law that Requires 
Retroactive Application. 
After establishing that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to 
determine whether substantive rules interpreting the Constitution 
could be applied retroactively in state collateral proceeding, the Court 
next had to decide if the rule articulated in Miller qualified as 
 
 49. Id. at 728-29. 
 50. Id. at 729. 
 51. The Court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution affords state courts no 
greater power than federal habeas courts to force a prisoner to remain incarcerated under a law that 
is unconstitutional. Id. at 729, 731–32. It further opined that if state courts allow claims controlled 
by federal law to be brought by prisoners in their state collateral proceedings, then the state courts 
must apply the substantive constitutional rules that govern the outcome of the issues raised. Id. 
 52. The majority reasoned that there are substantive rules that “set forth categorical 
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the 
State’s power to impose. It follows that when a State enforces a . . . penalty barred by the 
Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful.” Id. at 729-30. 
 53. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730 (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 
715, 724 (1971)). 
 54. Id. at 724 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879)). 
 55. Id. 
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sufficiently substantive. The Court repeated that a substantive rule of 
law is one that both forbids punishment of certain conduct, and one 
that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a group of 
defendants based on their status or offense.56 Thus, substantive rules 
of law protect against disproportionate punishments that violate the 
Eighth Amendment.57 The rule announced by Miller, the Court 
reasoned, did just that: it deemed a sentence of LWOP an 
unconstitutional sentence for all but the rarest juvenile offenders.58 
Finding that Miller’s prohibition on this punishment for juveniles 
was a substantive rule of law, the Court acknowledged that there are 
procedural components inherent in the Miller decision,59 but that these 
procedural requirements do not undermine the substantive heart of the 
decision, that “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing.”60 Granting prisoners convicted as juveniles a 
hearing where their age and attendant characteristics are considered 
only gives effect to the substantive rule of constitutional law 
proscribed in Miller: “that life without parole is an excessive sentence 
for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”61 In 
conclusion, the majority found Miller is a substantive rule of 
constitutional law that, under Teague, must be applied retroactively to 
convictions challenged collaterally.62 
C.  The Dissenting Opinions 
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas took issue with the 
majority’s discussion of the Court’s jurisdiction to decide the case. 
Justice Scalia pointed out that the cases cited by the majority for the 
proposition that new constitutional rules must be applied retroactively 
dealt with issues pending on direct review.63 He reasoned that 
collateral review cases are “fundamentally different” than cases 
pending on direct review because collateral proceedings, by their 
 
 56. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)) 
(internal quotations and punctuation omitted). 
 57. Id. at 732–33. 
 58. Id. at 734. The Court acknowledged that the one exception in the Miller rule for the 
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption, did not eliminate the fact that Miller 
mandated that LWOP was an excessive punishment for the class of all other juvenile offenders. 
 59. Id. at 734-35. 
 60. Id. at 733 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464). 
 61. Id. at 735. 
 62. Id. at 736. 
 63. Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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nature, disrupt finality.64 Moreover, Justice Scalia reasoned that 
Teague’s general rule of prohibiting retroactive application of new 
rules in collateral proceedings, and even its limited exceptions, were 
not based on the Constitution.65 Specifically, Justice Scalia questioned 
the majority’s reliance on the Supremacy Clause.66 He argued that the 
Supremacy Clause did not give the majority jurisdiction to decide the 
case, but instead lead to another question: which federal law is 
supreme. Looking at the precedent relied on by the majority, Scalia 
found that the “supreme” law requires federal courts to “review state-
court decisions against the law and factual record that existed at the 
time the decisions were made.”67 Thus, if federal habeas courts must 
follow “old rules” existing at the time of the state court conviction, 
Scalia found no justification in the Supremacy Clause allowing the 
“new” Miller rule to apply to a state court conviction and subsequent 
denial of habeas relief.68 
Even assuming there was jurisdiction to decide the case, Justice 
Scalia concluded that Miller did not espouse a substantive rule, but 
instead proscribed a new procedure by requiring a sentencing court to 
“follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and 
attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”69 
Thus, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, not only was the majority incorrect 
in its classification of the Miller rule, but the Court should not have 
even touched the case in the first place.70 
Justice Thomas agreed, but wrote separately to highlight the lack 
of authority in the Constitution’s text, or its history, for the majority’s 
jurisdiction.71 Absent from the Supremacy Clause,72 Article III,73 the 
 
 64. Id. at 739. 
 65. Id. at 738-39. Instead, Justice Scalia notes the majority in Teague understood the 
disruption that collateral proceedings had on finality, and in no way discussed constitutional issues. 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 738-39. Naturally, Justice Scalia reasoned that “[a]ny relief a prisoner 
might receive in a state court after finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription.” Id. 
 66. See supra note 51. 
 67. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 738-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. 
Ct. 38, 43–44 (2011)). 
 68. Id. at 741. 
 69. Id. (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471) (emphasis omitted). 
 70. Id. at 744. 
 71. Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 72. Justice Thomas reasoned that the Supremacy Clause mandates that if there is a federal 
constitutional right in existence, then that right trumps any contrary rule of state law. It does not 
allow for the creation of substantive rights that will thereafter supersede state law. Id. 
 73. Likewise, Article III of the Constitution defines the scope of federal judges’ power, and 
therefore cannot implicate the decisions of state post-conviction courts. Id. at 745-46. 
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Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,74 and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right 
to void an unconstitutional sentence that has already been finalized. 
Without a constitutional basis for the majority’s new rule of 
retroactivity,75 Justice Thomas opined that the majority lacked 
jurisdiction to impose the Miller rule on the state’s collateral 
decision.76 
PART V:  MAKING HABEAS RELIEF ACCESSIBLE 
The AEDPA has been viewed as an almost insurmountable hurdle 
for prisoners convicted in state courts to overcome. Lower courts’ 
hands are tied in the face of Supreme Court precedent.77 The AEDPA 
changed the deferential scheme laid out in Brown v. Allen.78 Instead, 
the AEDPA allows a federal court to step in where the state court’s 
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court” or resulted in an unreasonable 
determination of the facts that were presented in the state court 
proceeding.79 This unreasonable standard allows state court 
convictions to be overturned,80 as a federal habeas court cannot 
 
 74. The Due Process Clause, similarly, applied to governmental actions violating the law of 
the land at the time of those governmental actions. Moreover, Justice Thomas reasoned that, even 
if due process anticipated new substantive rules, it does not require courts to “revisit settled 
convictions or sentences on collateral review.” Id. 
 75. Justice Thomas further reasoned that the history of both state and federal post-conviction 
proceedings does not support the majority’s rule of retroactivity. Id. at 747-48. 
 76. Id. at 744-45. 
 77. In his critique of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the AEDPA, Judge Reinhardt of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals states that these restrictive interpretations of the statute are 
justified by the Court on the basis that “[f]ederal habeas review of state convictions frustrates both 
the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional 
rights and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial 
authority.” Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified 
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of 
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 
1229-30 (2015) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
 78. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Following this decision, federal habeas courts were not bound by the 
state court determinations, even if the issues raised in the state court proceedings mirrored those 
made in the federal habeas proceeding. See Charles Doyle, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal 
Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONGRESS 8, 14 (Apr. 26, 2006), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33391.pdf. 
 79. 22 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2016). 
 80. See Reinhardt, supra note 77, at 1241-42. Judge Reinhardt noted fifteen cases in which 
the Supreme Court granted review of habeas cases in order to reverse the appellate decisions that 
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overturn even a clearly erroneous state court decision.81 In fact, many 
recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the court’s apprehension in 
overturning a state court’s denial of habeas relief,82 reasoning that 
finality and confidence in a state court’s judgment must be given great 
weight.83 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery illustrates a 
departure from this restrictive framework. By giving petitioners who 
were sentenced as juveniles the ability to apply for relief under a new 
substantive rule of law retroactively, the Court provides a more 
navigable path for prisoners to obtain habeas relief.84 In doing so, the 
majority’s opinion gives credence to the underlying premise of the 
great writ of habeas corpus: to safeguard against unjust detainment and 
protect individual liberty.85 Moreover, the majority recognizes the 
multitude of definitions of finality. Finality can be achieved by the 
knowledge that a defendant has been rehabilitated, that he or she has 
“learned a lesson.”86 Finality is the knowledge that the person behind 
 
granted habeas relief and thereby did not grant sufficient deference to the state court judgments. 
See id. 
 81. See Reinhardt, supra note77, at 1225. Judge Reinhardt attempted to analyze Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Harrington v. Ritcher, which stated that the AEDPA gave federal courts 
habeas authority only where there is “no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state 
court’s decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Id. at 1228 (quoting Harrington 
v. Ritcher, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011)) (emphasis omitted). He opined that this effectively 
prohibits a federal habeas court from ever granting habeas relief, because to do so appellate judges 
“would need to find that each of the state court judges who denied the petitioner’s claim was not 
fairminded.” See id. at 1229. 
 82. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas 
relief); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013) (rejecting petitioner’s claim for 
habeas relief even while admitting that his constitutional due process rights may have been 
violated). 
 83. Reinhardt, supra note 77, at 1230. Judge Reinhardt suggests that the Supreme Court 
ignores the practical effects of giving too much discretion to state courts, who not only have judges 
that must be reelected each year and therefore have political stances to illustrate, but also have very 
heavy caseloads and therefore cannot meticulously address each federal habeas claim. Id. at 
1231-32. 
 84. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences for Youthful 
Criminals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/ 
opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-sentences-for-youthful-criminals. 
 85. Robert Perkinson, The Gutted Writ: On Habeas Corpus, THE NATION (Dec. 22, 2010) 
https://www.thenation.com/article/gutted-writ-habeas-corpus. 
 86. Jeanne Bishop, A Victims’ Family Member on Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences: 
“Brutal Finality” and Unfinished Souls, 9 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 85, 88 (2016). Bishop, in 
reviewing the judicial scheme regarding LWOP sentences for juveniles before Miller, notes another 
definition of finality which “comes when an offender is rehabilitated and no longer a threat, when 
a sentence is served and over and the offender is set free. There are no more court dates or hearings, 
no more wrangling in legal proceedings. The case is done[.]” Id. at 88. 
50.2_GUMAER_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18 9:08 PM 
268 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:257 
bars was fairly incarcerated based on the numerous chances she had to 
defend herself in our judicial system, including by the use of the great 
writ. Lastly, by requiring all courts to apply new substantive rules of 
constitutional law, the majority implicitly recognizes the fundamental 
unfairness of keeping someone sentenced under a law that he or she 
could not be sentenced under if their case was decided today. 
PART VI:  CONCLUSION 
By hearing an appeal following a state denial of habeas relief, the 
decision shows the Court’s willingness to provide channels for 
prisoners convicted in state court to access federal habeas relief.87 
According to the majority opinion, it seems as though any prisoner 
who pursues state habeas relief in reliance on new federal laws will 
benefit.88 On the other hand, perhaps the Court is only attempting to 
grant more relief to those convicted as juveniles, illustrating a soft spot 
for those convicted under dated and harsh laws when they were mere 
children. 
Irrespective of its possible motivations, the Court’s willingness to 
interfere with the deference given to a state court in a state court 
habeas proceeding is a clear departure from its previous decisions.89 
This sharp departure from precedent, alone, demands attention from 
all courts, as it illustrates the majority favoring protection of 
substantive rights over federalism. This cry for attention will likely be 
echoed by state court prisoners, who will use Montgomery to correct 
their sentences that under today’s substantive laws would be illegal. 
Following Montgomery it seems that “locking the door and throwing 
away the key” is no more than an overused cliché. 
 
 
 
 
 
 87. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2016). Here, Montgomery’s case went 
straight from the state court’s denial of habeas relief to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
bypassing the initial requirement of filing for habeas relief in federal court before reaching the high 
court. 
 88. In its reasoning, the majority stated that new substantive rules of law will apply 
retroactively in any proceeding, not just in federal habeas proceedings. Thus, petitioners can now 
argue that a new law decided in federal court must be applied retroactively to their state case, so 
long as they prove the substantive nature of the new rule. See supra Section IV(A). 
 89. For example, in Teague the Court ruled on the retroactivity of laws only in federal habeas 
proceedings, deciding not to interfere with state court decisions. See supra Part IV. 
